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Abstract
Given the rise in private equity companies’ dry powder reserves, as well as the increased
prevalence of covenant-lite loans pointing to a change in the overall dynamic of leveraged loan
dealmaking, this paper aims to determine whether dry powder is a significant determinant of
leveraged loan spreads. This paper uses a sample of loan level contract variables, borrower
characteristics, and macroeconomic conditions from DealScan, Compustat, Pitchbook, and the
Federal Reserve Economic Data. My findings are consistent with the hypothesis that availability
of funds, measured in dry powder, is a good determinant of spread. As leveraged loans are a
necessary component of leveraged buyouts, when dry powder reserves are high, investor sentiment
is positive and the market is friendly to credit investors. This means that bank and nonbank lenders
are more likely to capitalize on the active leveraged loan market, which potentially means giving
out riskier loans and charging higher premiums for these said loans. Therefore, I hypothesize that
dry powder and spread have a positive and significant relationship. These findings were
statistically significant when tested during the black swan years in the given sample period,
controlling for robust standard errors, and including broad sector fixed effects. Finally, when tested
across different tranche types, different characteristics became more significant to spread.
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I.

Introduction
In recent years, private equity firms have raised round after round of capital through limited

partners, leading to a peak of 532 rounds of funding in the United States in 2018. The increasing
trend of raising more capital concurrently leads to an increase in dry powder, or the reserves of
committed but unallocated capital a firm has on hand. With more leveraged buyout (“LBO”)
investing taking place and therefore, more leveraged loans employed in the making of these deals,
it is natural to wonder whether there is a relationship between the amount of dry powder and spread.
This paper explores the impact of dry powder on spread using other economic measures,
namely the 10-year Treasury rate, loan level data, including number of financial covenants, and
firm-specific measures, such as firm size, debt to EBITDA ratio, and return on assets as control
variables. I expand upon prior research by incorporating macroeconomic measures, analyzing loan
level, and firm specific data to test which variables have the most impact on determining leveraged
loan spreads.
A 2019 Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City primer found that premiums charged to
leveraged borrowers have fallen across all loan types since 2016. Term loan spreads have fallen
continuously after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, while revolving loan spreads have been more
stable in their decline from the post-crisis era. One reason for this is that the typical behavior for
the lenders of revolving term loans has varied in the post crisis era (Lee, Liu, and Stebunovs 2017).
Since banks are the typical providers of credit in revolving loans, they are more able to withstand
the liquidity risk these credit lines entail. Compared to banks, nonbank finance companies are more
likely to make secured loans, take on riskier loans, and lend to riskier borrowers (Carey, Post and
Sharpe 1998).
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This trend of falling spreads across all loan types is a testament to the change in control,
makeup and role that lenders play, especially when coupled with the increasing number of
covenant lite loans (“cov-lite”) that are issued as part of LBO deal packages. In 1997, the typical
loan had about three financial covenants, but by 2016, this number had dropped to a little less than
two covenants per loan, with much greater headroom (Griffin, Nini and Smith 2018). While Griffin,
Nini and Smith (2018) acknowledge that the increasing number of cov-lite loans has risen in step
with the increased participation by non-bank institutions in corporate lending, from 8% in 2001 to
23% in 2016, they conclude that the decline in contract restrictiveness extends beyond institutional
loans to tranches held primarily by banks, indicating that increased institutional participation
cannot be the whole explanation to the phenomenon. Their findings are challenged by Ivashina
and Vallee (2020), where they find that larger nonbank participation is conducive to weaker
contractual terms.
The weakness in contractual terms brought about by larger nonbank participation is echoed
by a recent study by Portfolio Management Data (PMD) and Standard & Poor’s (S&P) The New
Bargain: Leveraged Bank Loans (Miller, Rushmore and Van de Castle 1998). They showed
empirical evidence for two trends that have long been suspected. First, the institutional term loan
market is becoming more efficient from a credit-spread perspective. Second, investors are trading
off credit spread for liquidity, akin to the use of loan markets to “reach for yield” in response to
low interest rates.
In fact, Ivashina and Vallee (2020) find using the J. Crew example, where company value
was transferred from lenders towards shareholders, that weakened loan contracts typically appear
when banks retain a smaller share of the loan, giving way for institutional investors, such as
collateralized loans obligations and mutual finds. Furthermore, they also point out the possibility
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that private equity firms who have large debt expertise have an incentive to help portfolio firms
navigate crisis despite high levels of leverage, thereby potentially distorting usual signals from the
credit market and facilitating value extraction from creditors.
One may find it counterintuitive that a decline in spread is accompanied by a decline in
monitoring capacity and risk mitigation in the form of cov-lite loans. Studies have found that
higher quality borrowers signal creditworthiness through offering more collateral, and there is a
positive relationship between collateral and borrower credit worthiness (Besanko and Thakor
1987). However, the design of different tranches that have become increasingly more complex and
with different risk-return profiles might be responsible for this reduction in loan spreads (Alves et
al. 2021).
While companies are seemingly off the hook from a term loan covenant perspective, most
are still subject to line of credit maintenance covenants, typically by a bank lender, thereby creating
split control rights (Berlin, Nini and Yu 2020). They also find that banks retain their role as
monitoring borrower firms, while contracts have evolved to facilitate the banks’ new role as
monitors, mitigating bargaining frictions that arise with the entry of non-bank lenders. The findings
in Berlin et al. (2020) come in contrast to prior literature which suggests that cov-lite loans serve
to minimize ex-post conflicts of interest between syndicate members by removing banks from their
role as monitors (Billet et al. 2016). Since this phenomenon of lower spread and increased cov-lite
loans seems increasingly commonplace in loans issued in the near five years or so, we can turn
back towards exploring the characteristics that might have a direct link to determining spread.
Alves et al. (2021) find that that aside from firm characteristics, the financial system
structure and legal system all affect loan pricing. They find that targeting firms’ characteristics,
namely profitability and asset tangibility affects LBO deals’ cost of debt. Additionally, laws
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including creditor rights, institutions, and efficiency of contractual enforcement all affect LBO
loan spreads especially in market-based systems, such as the United States.
Lenders can also augment loan yield spreads with additional fees for syndication,
commitment fees and cancellation risks (Angbazo, Mei, and Sauders 1998). These variables are
commonplace for syndicated loans in highly leveraged transactions as in sponsor-backed private
equity deals.
Another strand of research shows that aside from borrower characteristics, more influential
in terms of credit spreads are lender characteristics and prevailing broader economic conditions.
In terms of lender characteristics, researchers find that regulatory capital adequacy is associated
with the strictness of financial covenants included in loan contracts (Demerjian, Owens and
Sokolowski 2021). They find that lenders with lower regulatory capital issue loans with lower
financial covenant strictness. Financial covenant efficiency is maximized when a technical default
occurs only when there is a material increase in risk of the borrower from the lender’s perspective.
With this in mind, Demerjian et al. (2021) find that lenders with lower regulatory capital set
covenant terms that reduce the likelihood of covenant violation. Banks with lower Tier 1 regulatory
capital issue loans with lower financial covenant strictness, consistent with lenders viewing
technical defaults as costlier when regulatory capital is lower. Their paper confirms that covenant
strictness is not only a function of the proportion of investors being bank or non-bank, but that
lender capital management incentives play a role in the rise of cov-lite loans. Hubbard, Kuttner
and Palia (2002) show that lender financial health is also an important determinant of spreads,
given that poorly capitalized banks tend to charge higher rates than well-capitalized banks. The
observation that poorly capitalized banks charge higher rates makes sense given the findings in
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Demerjian et al. (2021) that low-capital banks are more willing to issue loans with lower financial
covenant strictness.
Taking a macroeconomic perspective on linking uncertainty and debt covenants is
Demerjian (2017). The paper found that the borrower’s future performance, which determines
creditworthiness and ability to repay the loan is a function of both the borrower’s actions and the
future state of nature. For example, he found that financial covenant use increased without a clear
corresponding increase in agency conflicts after September 11, 2001. The paper measured
financial covenant intensity as the number of financial covenants used in each loan package. His
results showed that on loan level regressions, there was a significant association between financial
covenant use and the borrower and industry level measures, but not those measured at the economy
level. Demerjian (2017) implies that one must test for both firm-specific and macroeconomic
factors that might affect spread.
Prior literature discussed above encompasses a broad range of testable characteristics, from
lender data to borrower data to loan specific attributes, the relationship of lender and borrower,
and the macroeconomy. The inclusion of every single one of them would be impossible to focus
on in a semester long thesis project. My paper explores the impact on spread of economic measures,
namely dry powder with control variables being the 10-year Treasury rate, loan level data,
including number of financial covenants, and firm-specific measures, such as firm size, debt to
EBITDA ratio, and return on assets. I expand upon prior research by incorporating macroeconomic
measures, analyzing loan level data, and firm specific data to test which variables have the most
impact on determining leveraged loan spreads. Furthermore, I present regression data segmented
by tranche of debt in order to explore whether the variables which are most significant for the
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overall dataset hold true when compared among revolving credit, term loans, and all other debt
issued.

Yu 9
II.

Research design and sample selection

Research design
To examine the relationship between spread and various economic, loan level, and firmspecific characteristics, I estimate the following model using OLS:
𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑!,# = 𝛼 + 𝛽 $ 𝑄𝐷𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑑𝑒𝑟/𝑄𝐺𝐷𝑃# + 𝛽 % 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽 & 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒#
+ 𝛽 ' 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒!,# + 𝛽 ( 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴!,# + 𝛽 ) 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠!,# + 𝜀

The dependent variable, spread, is a measure of loan pricing and is expressed in basis points. The
total rate of a given loan is LIBOR + spread for the sample set.
The main independent variable is dry powder, calculated on a quarterly basis and
representative of how much in reserves of committed but unallocated capital private equity
companies are sitting on at any given moment. The regression variable is QDrypowder/QGDP,
which signifies a shrunken quarterly dry powder as a ratio of U.S. quarterly GDP. This method of
expressing dry powder is useful as it attempts to strip away the effects of inflation and growth in
GDP from the raw dry powder number. Dry powder is a proxy for investor sentiment given that
an increased pool of capital raised from private equity companies’ limited partners signifies
investors piling into private equity funds in search of higher returns. Of course, dry powder
reserves could also be a sign of private equity companies delaying investments when there is a
shortage of prime LBO candidates in the investable pool of companies. However, I took dry
powder to signify investor sentiment since dry powder would not naturally increase by itself if
private equity firms simply stop allocating capital. Dry powder needs constant replenishing, and
its consistent growth rate is evidence that there is growing demand from the limited partners’ side
for private equity returns and an increase in dry powder signifies investor sentiment. Given this
assumption of dry powder signifying investor demand, it is worthwhile to explore the relationship
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of investor sentiment and loan spreads, or the price at which loans are trending for bank and
nonbank loans.
Another important variable that is significant as part of loan characteristics is the number
of financial covenants a given loan entails. Traditionally, the greater the number of financial
covenants, the less risk the investment entails for a lender and the lower the spread, since lenders
will be able to dictate the interest coverage ratio and leverage a borrower must maintain or cannot
incur after lending. However, as mentioned above, the increasing trend of cov-lite loans and
reaching for yield has lowered both the prevalence of covenants and rates altogether. It is
interesting to see whether there is still significance in the number of financial covenants in each
loan as it pertains to the effect on loan spreads.
Given that 10-year Treasury rates are widely considered a proxy for investor sentiment, it
is included as an independent variable to determine whether rising yields mean higher spreads
since investors are driven to prefer higher yielding and riskier investments.
Finally, the firm characteristics explored include firm size, measured by total assets,
debt/EBITDA, as well as return on assets. These metrics were chosen since firm size is typically
a significant marker of a firm’s exposure to debt and creditworthiness, while debt/EBITDA is a
common creditor metric to determine how highly levered a company is and therefore, their
associated risk profile, and return on assets shows investors how efficient a company is at churning
capital investments into profit.

Sample selection
The sample of 760 observations used in this paper is based on all loans issued between
2000 and 2021 obtained through Dealscan and merged by gvkey and calendar year and quarter
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with firm-level financial statement data through Compustat using the WRDS Dealscan-Compustat
linking table. Compustat data is lagged back one quarter when matching to Dealscan data past, not
current performance would inform the terms set in place by lenders for a given company. Many
observations were cut out during matching Dealscan and Compustat data due to restricting the
sample to only U.S. companies through availability of a ticker. Because the original Dealscan
dataset was at a loan level dataset, many observations were further removed upon limiting each
deal to one of each tranche in order to avoid repetition of key characteristics that hold true in each
loan in each deal, including number of financial covenants and spreads in each tranche of debt.
This dataset was then merged in with Pitchbook data containing quarterly dry powder
measures from 2000-2021. Dry powder was also lagged a quarter since past availability of funds
would inform characteristics of deal making in the present day. Finally, I linked U.S. 10-year
Treasury data from FRED as a variable in my regression since commercial and leveraged loan
prevailing rates are typically highly affected by the central bank’s rates.
All regressions are done without years considered as “black swan” in the analysis, that means
the removal of 2009 and 2020 from the regression dataset. Since the effects of the 2008 crisis did
not materialize in 2008, but in 2009, that was the year omitted from the dataset used in the
regressions. The market had a quicker response time in 2020 on the other hand, as the crisis
occurred earlier in the year and caused immediate shutdowns. Furthermore, QDrypowder/QGDP
and Debt/EBITDA were Winsorized at 1% to keep them within reasonable bounds.
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III.

Data

Descriptive statistics

Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics

The mean spread is 268 bps. This spread is shared by revolvers, term loans, and other types
of debt issuances and is an average of the whole sample size. Quarterly dry powder is on average
about 4% of U.S. quarterly GDP and, as shown in Figure 1, is rising over time even when held as
a proportion of quarterly GDP. Table 2 and 3 give more detailed breakdowns of the number of
financial covenants broken down in a frequency table as well as segmented by tranche.

Table 2 – Number of financial covenants frequency table
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Table 3 – Number of financial covenants by tranche

Number of financial covenants by tranche
Table 2 shows that the majority of my dataset, 360 out of 760 loans, have no covenants.
This corroborates the growing trend of cov-lite loans. 90% of my data have between zero and two
financial covenants in total. Table 3 shows us that majority of the number of financial covenants
comes from delay draw term loans and revolvers, classified as “Other” in the tranche-specific
regression run. This again confirms what prior literature posited about split control rights whereby
although borrowers are not constrained by financial covenants in their typical term loans as much
as they used to, revolvers and other types of loans they take on can still constrain them, thereby
creating the split control.

Rate
Still on Table 1, the average 10-year Treasury in sample was about 3.5%, reaching as low
as 2.6% and high as 4.6% in the 25th and 75th percentiles respectively. Typical Debt/EBITDA ratio
was 7x, which is unsurprising and in line with the average leverage ratios of large LBOs. Given
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that our sample set is restricted to loans funding LBOs for public companies, most of these loans
are funding purchase prices in the billions.

Loans and sample set
A more detailed depiction of the number of loans, number of deals, the average loan size
and average deal size can be found in Table 4. The average loan size varied from year to year but
that each loan was typically a little more than half a million and reached several billion. The
number of LBO deals for public companies was even less, ranging from five in 2009 and 2020 to
28 in 2007. Again, since these years were anomalies, 2009 and 2020 were taken out of the main
and by-tranche regressions run.

Correlation matrix
In terms of looking at the possible correlation between variables, Table 5 shows the
correlation matrix run of all the variables. Most significant are the high negative correlations
between number of financial covenants and dry powder as well as rate and dry powder and the
high positive correlation between rate and number of financial covenants. It is then unsurprising
that when we move on to the OLS results, all three variables are not concurrently significant for
any given regression. The negative correlation between financial covenants and dry powder could
point to investor response to market signals. When financial covenants are higher, this signifies
the market’s reluctance to make deals happen smoother, therefore investors pull back and do not
allocate capital to supply dry powder. Tying into this explanation is the rationale for the negative
relationship between rate and dry powder. The lower rates are, the more investors try to reach for
returns in alternative forms of riskier investments. Finally, the positive relationship between rate
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and number of financial covenants reflect market sentiment when rates are higher. Lenders benefit
from the increase in rates, but since borrowers are less willing to borrow and the credit market
slows, lenders must protect downside risk more through increased use of financial covenants,
especially for revolving credit, which as we saw earlier drove the use of number of financial
covenants.

Table 4 – Loan and deal characteristics
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Table 5 – Variable correlation matrix

Finally, we look at the trend of the main independent variable, dry powder (Figure 1), and
the dependent variable, spread (Figure 2). Dry powder has seen an upward trend since 2000, with
varying growth rates but with an upward trend overall. By 2021, raw dry powder had grown over
8-10x where it started in 2000, and it has increased from 1% to 8% of quarterly GDP. Spread has
seen a sharp increase before 2010 but has been decreasing since 2016 which underscores the 2019
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas primer report’s findings as well as Griffin et. al (2018).

Figure 1 – Proportion of dry powder as a fraction of U.S. GDP
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Figure 2 – Spread over time
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IV.

Empirical findings

As discussed in section II, a key supposition underlying this study is the effect that
macroeconomic, loan-level, and firm specific variables have on spread. Thus, I run the following
regression in Figure 3:
𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑!,# = 𝛼 + 𝛽 $ 𝑄𝐷𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑑𝑒𝑟/𝑄𝐺𝐷𝑃# + 𝛽 % 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽 & 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒#
+ 𝛽 ' 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒!,# + 𝛽 ( 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴!,# + 𝛽 ) 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠!,# + 𝜀

Regressions 1 through 3 add upon what I initially hypothesized to be the three most explanatory
variables, regression 4 explores the impact of only firm-specific metrics, and regression 5 puts it
all together. Regression 6 includes an interaction variable with a dummy variable for deals before
2011 and quarterly dry powder / quarterly GDP. The interaction variable that is pre-2011 aims to
explain any difference in variable impact of the first half (pre-2011) to the second half (post-2011)
of my data.
These results are robust to sector fixed effects, broadly defined as Corporates,
Media/Communications, Bank, Non-bank financials, and Utilities. Regression results confirm that
the three hypothesized main variables are indeed correlated since not all three end up having
significant explanatory power once all three are added in. Once again, I use a shrunken quarterly
dry powder measure to express it in terms of quarterly GDP in order to minimize its potential
growth as affected by inflation or growth in GDP. The dry powder measure seems to have the most
explanatory power, as it was significant to at least 99% and even 99.9% on all but one regression
where only the dry powder measure, number of financial covenants, and rate were included.
Unsurprisingly, firm size and return on assets were very negatively significant to spread since
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larger firms as well as those who have a better track record of return on assets can supposedly
command lower priced loans and thus, lower spreads.

Main results
Turning to our Figure 3 results, by itself, the dry powder measure is significant at 99.9%.
Looking at regression 1, a one standard deviation move in the dry powder measure could signify
a change in spread of about 352 basis points. This supports the positive correlation that we saw in
the correlation matrix. When investors pile money into dry powder reserves, more capital is
allocated for deal making, and this naturally occurs when, the credit markets are free-flowing so
the spreads reflect this.
As previously mentioned, due to the significant correlation between the dry powder
measure, the number of financial covenants, and the rate, when all three are added in, dry powder
loses its explanatory power and instead only rate is negatively significant at 95% confidence. A
standard deviation move in rate constitutes an opposite reaction in spread of up to 6 basis points.
When only firm-specific metrics are regressed on spread, firm size and return on assets are
most negatively significant. This is unsurprising since larger firms and firms with better track
record of return on assets are also better candidates for investment and can thus command lower
spreads. These findings for firm-specific metrics hold true even after adding in the three main
independent variables suggesting that firm-specific variables are important factors to determining
spreads.
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Figure 3 – OLS regressions

Data with and without black swan years
Since the number of loans issued and deals conducted in 2009 and 2020 were so drastically
different from other years in the sample, all regressions run except for those in Figure 4 exclude
these two years, deemed as black swan years. Results from Figure 4 confirm that the significance
in dry powder is statistically significant even when controlling for black swan anomalies. The
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significance in rate and number of financial covenants chance between the dataset including black
swan years and those that do not include them. Rate is more significant for normal times, while
the number of financial covenants has a negative and significant impact on spread when including
black swan years. This is unsurprising since during times of crisis, lenders would be more likely
to strategize ways to minimize risk when lending to borrowers, and this constitutes the number of
financial covenants placed upon each loan.

Figure 4 – OLS regression with and without observations from black swan years
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Tranche level data
It is also extremely useful to look at tranche-level data when determining the effects of
each of the different variables. As we can see from Figure 5, revolving credit lines, term loans, and
all other types of debt not only behave differently, but each of these tranche spreads are also
determined by different variables. Since majority of our dataset, 342 observations, are term loans,
it behaves the most similarly to our results in the overall OLS regression in Figure 3. Other
interesting observations of this tranche separated data confirms what one knows to be typical
aspects of each loan tranche. Revolvers are bank debt and often asset-backed and paid off annually
with a smaller running balance. Firm size is the only significant determinant of spread for revolvers.
Term loans, on the other hand are positively affected by the dry powder measure used, negatively
affected by firm size and ROA, and these significant variables are similar to the outcome of the
overall regressions run in Figure 3. The All else category is composed of delay draw term loans,
bridge loans, CAPEX facilities, and others. This category has the fewest amount of loans and the
variables significant to these other loans illustrate the increased risk that lenders take on when
providing capital through these unique debt types to these borrowers. As such, the most significant
variables to other loans not including revolvers or term loans, include loan-level data, the number
of financial covenants, as well as firm-specific characteristics including firm size and return on
assets.
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Figure 5 – Tranche level OLS regressions

Summary
In summary, my results show that dry powder is a good predictor of spread with a positive
relationship among the two. These results showing dry powder’s significance on spread holds in
both datasets, including with black swan and without black swan events and is robust to sector
fixed effects. My data also confirmed that lenders who take on increased risk are compensated
through higher spreads. These lenders are also able to decrease their risk through the imposition
of an increase in the number of financial covenants. Tranche level data also shows that lenders
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adapt to what is material and significant depending on the characteristics of the loan issued and
their risk profile depending on the tranche level issued. I recognize that the lower than desirable
R-squared potentially means these variables chosen are not the most impactful to the ultimate
determination of spread. However, as mentioned earlier, there have been many factors explored
that could impact spread and the goal of this paper was to explore whether dry powder was
meaningful and significant. To this end, the paper has achieved this goal.
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V.

Conclusion

With the backdrop of private equity funds raising fund after fund, the main goal of this paper
is to explore the effect of dry powder on one of the most significant price credit terms, spread. The
increase in dry powder is material, from a raw numbers perspective as well as when shrunken as a
proportion of quarterly GDP. The dataset I have runs from 2000 through 2021, and within this
time period, quarterly dry powder has grown from approximately 1% to 8% of U.S. quarterly GDP.
I hypothesize that an increase in dry powder signifies the strength of the credit market,
increased demand for loans, and therefore, an increase in spread. Since investors are logically
seeking higher returns from alternative investments, which rely heavily upon deal-making through
leveraged loans, the positive correlation between dry powder and spread is posited. The results of
this paper show that there is indeed a positive correlation between dry powder and spread. The
impact of one on the other is positive and significant, even with control variables relevant to the
macroeconomy, loan characteristics, and firm-specific characteristics are present. Dry powder’s
significance on spread holds true even when a dataset including black swan events such as the
2008 Global Financial Crisis and the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic are included in the regression test.
Additionally, when the dataset was segmented into tranche-level data, we find that the relationship
of dry powder on spread is strongest on term loans. Revolvers are most impacted by firm size and
other types of debt, presumably riskier, are more impacted by number of financial covenants, firm
size, and return on assets.
Overall, we find that dry powder is a statistically significant measure on spread, given the other
important control variables and low R-squared withstanding. QDrypowder/QGDP as a variable
meant to capture dry powder scaled to GDP came up significant to between 95% and 99%
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confidence on most regressions in the main regression, black swan event included regression, as
well as term loans in tranche-level separated data.
It is also noteworthy that the whole dataset being studied from 2000 through 2021 exists in a
low-rate environment that is about to change drastically in the coming year with the Fed giving
guidance on upcoming rate hikes. A potential impact this might have is that 10-year Treasury rates
become an even stronger variable of predicting spread than it otherwise would have been. Highrate environments are not private equity investor friendly as private equity deal returns are harder
to come by with higher leveraged loan spreads. To underscore this point, since dry powder has a
strong negative correlation with spread, this also means that the higher rates go, the less likely
investors will pile their money in on new private equity funds. Since spread moves in positive
correlation to dry powder, and less deals will now be made in the hostile private equity investor
market, so spread will potentially also adjust downward to adequately capture market demand. For
future studies, a larger and longer dataset incorporating both high and low rate environments, with
more control variables that account for number of lenders, borrower-lender past relationship, and
other pertinent firm-specific information would be most enriching to the various explanatory
variables that could point to the explanation of how leverage loan spreads move.
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